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FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND WATER POLLUTION:
STATUTORY PREEMPTION OR PRESERVATION?
INTRODUCTION
Pollution of the nation's water has become an increasing concern
for government, industry, and the public.' Although the primary
efforts at halting water pollution have been legislative,' courts also
have been requested to resolve this environmental problem.' In Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee,4 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the well-
established right of a state to assert a federal common law nuisance
action for interstate water pollution.) More importantly, the Court
1. Environmental Law Institute, Federal Environmental Law 2 (1974); A Reitze,
1 Environmental Law 4-2 (1972); Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, The
Courts, and The Congress, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1073, 1073-74 (1970); Introduction to I
Harv. Envt'l L. Rev. at xvii-xviii (1976). "Our planet is beset with a cancer which
threatens our very existence and which will not respond to the kind of treatment that
has been prescribed in the past. The cancer of water pollution was engendered by
our abuse of our lakes, streams, rivers, and oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted
attempts to control it; and like any other disease, it can kill us." 118 Cong. Rec.
33692 (1972), reprinted in 1 Environmental Policy Division of the Cong. Research
Serv., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, at 161 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History] (remarks of Sen. Mus-
kie).
2. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Deepwater Port Act of
1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-
300j (1976 & Supp. II 1979); The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. E.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974); Illinois v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S.
July 28, 1980) (No. 80-126); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 14 Envlr.
Rep. Cases (BNA) 2010 (D. Conn. 1980). The role of the judiciary in environmental
disputes is largely confined to review of administrative decisions and statutory inter-
pretation. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). The federal common law of nuisance pro-
vides the most innovative exception. Comment, Federal Common Law of Nuisance
Reaches New High Water Mark as Supreme Court Considers Illinois v. Milwaukee
II, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 10101, 10101 (1980) [hereinafter cited as High Water
Mark]; Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1,139,
1439 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Interstate Pollution].
4. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
5. Id. at 104-08; see North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Pennsyl-
vania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
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held that federal common law6 provides a jurisdictional basis for
suing in federal district court.,
Some federal courts, however, interpreted the Illinois decision as a
mandate from the Court to fashion a federal nuisance action appli-
cable to all parties , and all bodies of water." These extensions of
6. "Federal common law" has been defined as "[a] concept intriguing to legal
theorists. Strictly speaking, [it is] a nonentity." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 461 3d
ed. 1969). In fact, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). held that "'(t]hcre is
no federal general common law". Id. at 78. There is, however, a body of "specialized
federal common law." Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the 'ew Federal Com-
mon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964). Specialized federal common law de-
velops only when "there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform
rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism." Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin,
D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal
System 756-832 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hart & Wechsler]- C. Wright,
Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 60 (3d ed. 1976); Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024
(1967); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797 (1957),
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Note, Choice of Law in Federal Bail Bond Con-
tracts: Protecting Principles of Federalism, 49 Fordhain L. Rev. 133 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Choice of Law]; Note, The Federal Common Law. 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1512 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Federal Common Late], Note, The Competence
of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1084 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Competence of Federal Courts]; Note, Rules of Decision in Non-
diversity Suits, 69 Yale L.J. 1428 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Decision].
7. 406 U.S. at 100. The Illinois decision has prompted extensive commentary.
E.g., Campbell, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee: Federal Question Jurisdiction Through
Federal Common Law, 3 Envt'l L. 267 (1973); Comment, Federal Common Late and
the Environment: Illinois v. Milwaukee, 2 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 10168 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Environment]; Comment, The Expansion of Federal Common
Law and Federal Question Jurisdiction to Interstate Pollution, 10 Hous. L. Rev. 121
(1972); Note, Federal Common Law Remedies for the Abatement of Water Pollution,
5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 549 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal Common Law
Remedies]; 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 795 (1974); 14 B.C. Indus. & Com. L.
Rev. 767 (1973); 49 Den. L.J. 609 (1973); 77 Dick. L. Rev. 451 (1972); 52 Neb. L.
Rev. 301 (1973); 7 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 790 (1973); 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 246 (1977);
34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 590 (1977); 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 597.
8. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233-34
(3d Cir.) (private parties), cert. granted sub nor. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-
1760 & 80-12); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d
1008, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 1979) (municipality), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980);
Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th
Cir. 1975) (state agency); Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618,
622 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (river itself). Many courts have e-xpanded the federal nuisance
action to encompass the federal government. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc.,
498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 363 F. Supp. 110, 120 (D. Vt.), aff'd inem., 487 F.2d
1393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1973); United States ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. 111. 1973). Other
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Illinois have occurred despite the passage of comprehensive federal
water pollution legislation. ° Resort to the vagaries of "[p]oor old
nuisance"" to control water pollution is especially disconcerting be-
courts, however, have indicated that the federal nuisance action is restricted to
states. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 216 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971);
Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1213 (D.N.J.
1978); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd nere.
sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977);
Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 375 F. Supp.
1148, 1153 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
9. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 630 (7th Cir.) (all waters of
United States), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 30,3 (U.S. July 28, 1980) (No.
80-126); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036,
1040 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal common law may extend "to all of our navigable
waters"); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556,
558 (N.D. II1. 1973) (denied motion to dismiss federal common law claim based on
intrastate water pollution). Most courts have restricted the federal nuisance action to
interstate waters. Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443, 445 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Adm'n, 5,11
F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1976); Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514
F.2d 492, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1975), modified and remanded on other grounds, 529
F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281 (D.
Conn. 1976), aff'd mere. sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573
F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977).
10. The primary legislation governing water pollution is the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III). Originally
enacted in 1949, the FWPCA has been amended seven times between 1956 and
1977. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-890, 70
Stat. 498; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903;
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91; Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. To avoid confusion, this Note
will refer to the present statute as the Clean Water Act (CWA).
11. Wright, The Federal Courts and The Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
Wayne L. Rev. 317, 331 (1967). The law of nuisance has been aptly described as
"perhaps [the most] ... impenetrable jungle in the entire law." W. Prosser, Hand-
book of the Law of Torts § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971). Its application to modern
environmental problems has been questioned. Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Pub-
lic Regulation of Water Quality Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 Iowa L.
Rev. 186, 197 (1966); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion
of Private Rights, 1967 Duke L.J. 1126, 1130-37; Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private
Nuisance, 3 Nat. Resources Law. 475, 484-86 (1970); Interstate Pollution, supra note
3, at 1451-53; Note, Environmental Law-The Nuances of Nuisance in a Private Ac-
tion to Control Air Pollution, 80 W. Va. L. Rev. 48, 81-85 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Nuances of Nuisance].
502 [Vol. 49
WATER POLLUTION
cause it was in response to the inadequacies of the common law that
federal regulatory schemes were enacted. 12
The Illinois litigation is again before the Supreme Court." The
primary question on appeal is whether the Clean Water Act of 1972
(CWA) preempts the federal common law of nuisance." This Note
contends that the CWA has, in certain situations, supplanted the
federal common law in controlling pollution of our nation's water
supply. The federal common law of nuisance, however, remains a
vehicle for protecting our federal structure of government by provid-
ing an impartial means of adjudicating states' rights in interstate wa-
ter resources.
I. BACKGROUND: HIsTORY OF VATER POLLtrriON Co-riROL
Historically, the primary mechanism for controlling water pollution
was the common law of nuisance." The case-by-case approach of
common law, however, proved inadequate to deal with the modem
pollution problems of our highly industrial society." In response to
the ad hoc methodology of nuisance law" and the increasing environ-
12. F. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 3.03 (1977), WVright, supra note
11, at 331; see Environmental Law Institute, supra note 1. at 3-17. Hines, supra
note 11, at 201-04.
13. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). cert. granted.
445 U.S. 926 (1980) (No. 79-408). On remand from the Supreme Court's original
decision, the district court granted Illinois' request for an injunction. Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, 8 Envt'l L. Rep. (ELI) 20503 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The Seventh Circuit
affirmed. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). The City of
Milwaukee petitioned for certiorari, and it was granted. City of Milaukee v. Illinois
445 U.S. 926 (1980) (No. 79-408).
14. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 48 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1979) (No.
79-408) (news summary of questions presented), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (19'O
The Supreme Court has decided to hear an appeal in another case presenting a
similar question. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Claminers Ass'n.
101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754. 79-1760 & 80-12). The question pre-
sented is whether a federal common law nuisance action for damages sustained from
water pollution, if ever available to a private citizen, is preempted by the CWA. Id.
at 314-15.
15. McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common bite. 1 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 27, 37 (1948). Early nuisance cases involved diversion of water. Id The
nuisance action, however, was soon extended to conduct "infecting and corrupting"
air and water. William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816. 821 (K.B. 1611. Since
William Aldred's Case, nuisance has been widely used in environmental litigation.
Cartwright, Handling of Air and Water Pollution Cases by the Plaintiff. 9 Forum
639, 642-43 (1974).
16. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control. in Federal Environmen-
tal Law 682, 789 (1974); Jackson, supra note 1, at 1076. Wright. supra note 11. it
331; Comment, Equity and the Eco-systern: Can Injunctions Clean the Air?. 6S
Mich. L. Rev. 1254, 1254-55 (1970); Interstate Pollution. supra note 3, at 1451-5.3.
17. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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mental concerns of the nation,' Congress, in 1949, enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)."9 Nevertheless, the
FWPCA, although repeatedly amended,2" remained an insufficient re-
sponse to the nation's growing water pollution problem.21
Relying on a decentralized approach to water pollution control, the
FWPCA entrusted the primary regulatory apparatus to the states.2
State decision-making, however, engendered a parochial approach to
controlling pollution. Strong business pressures often forced states to
set low water quality standards rather than lose important industries
to states with more lenient environmental regulations z3 Additionally,
18. 94 Cong. Rec. 8196 (1948) (statement of Sen. Mundt).
19. Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-793, 62 Stat. 1154 (current version at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. I)). Although there had been previous federal
statutes applicable to water pollution, they were limited to scope. See, e.g., River
and Harbor Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976); Act of Aug. 21,
1916, 43 U.S.C. § 362 (1976); Oil Pollution Act, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604 (1924) (re-
pealed 1970).
20. See note 10 supra.
21. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3674, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note
1, at 1425; Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103, 1105 (1970); Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 Land & Water L. Rev. 369, 372
(1974); Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 672, 674-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Amendments].
The FWPCA was so insufficient that federal authorities resorted to the Refuse Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1976), as a means of controlling pollution. Ipsen &
Raisch, supra, at 372; Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A
Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 766-69 (1971). The effec-
tiveness of the Refuse Act, however, was seriously undermined soon after its resur-
rection. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d '168, '175-
76 (3d Cir. 1972) (polluter cannot be convicted under Refuse Act for discharging
without a permit), modified on other grounds, 411 U.S. 655 (1973); Kalur v. Resor,
335 F. Supp. 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1971) (federal authorities enjoined from issuing per-
mits under the Refuse Act).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (repealed 1972). Pursuant to the FWPCA, states were re-
sponsible for developing water quality standards applicable to their waters. ld.
§ 1160(c)(1), (3). States were free to establish enforcement procedures regarding intra-
state waters. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3669, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 1, at 1420. A conference procedure was available among state and federal au-
thorities if a state's standards were unacceptably low 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(2) (re-
pealed 1972). State enforcement was possible when a discharge resulted in a reduc-
tion of water quality below the established standard, id. § 1160(c)(5), but federal
initiative was limited to interstate pollution endangering health or welfare, and then
only after a six month wait and administrative hearings. Id. § 1160(f)(1). These proce-
dures clearly limited the effectiveness of the Act. EPA v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976); Amendments, supra note 21, at 671-75.
23. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378
& n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 117 Cong. Rec. 39678 11971), reprinted in 2 Legisla-
[Vol. 49
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state officials, 'less conscious of problems beyond their own jurisdic-
tion, were often likely to disregard spillovers of pollutants into adjoin-
ing states."4 Therefore, the FWPCA failed to resolve two major
problems: protection of the quality of the nation's water supply, -? and
protection of the environmental integrity of the states.-" Both these
problems were addressed in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," and ironi-
cally, it was "[p]oor old nuisance" ' that emerged as the only law
then available to deal with the complexities presented. -:
A. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
The Illinois litigation began when the State of Illinois, frustrated in
its attempts to gain relief under the FWPCA,1 alleged that four cities
and two local sewage commissions of the State of Wisconsin were
polluting Lake Michigan, 3' an interstate body of water. Pursuant to
section 1251(a)(1) of the United States Code, which vests in the Su-
preme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over controversies be-
tween states,32 Illinois sought injunctive relief in the Supreme
tive History, supra note 1, at 1405 (remarks of Sen. Muskie), 118 Cong. lee. 10240-
41 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1. at 452-53 (remarks of
Rep. Reuss); id. at 10244, 10251, reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 1. at
472, 475 (remarks of Gov. Wendell Anderson); id. at 10639, reprinted in I Legisla-
tive History, supra note 1, at 517 (remarks of Rep. Dingell), Wright, supra note 11,
at 331-32.
24. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196. 1227 1977I.
25. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971). reprinted in (1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3674, reprinted in 2 Legislative History. vupra note
1, at 1425 ("Federal water pollution control program .. .has been inadequate in
every vital aspect."); McThernia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 195, 200 (1973) C"The
impotency of ... prior legislation is beyond question.").
26. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Ohio v. \Vyandotte
Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 2:36 (10th Cir 197l
27. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
28. Wright, supra note 11, at 331.
29. 406 U.S. at 103.
30. Brief for Respondents at 23, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois. No. 79-40S (U.S.,
filed Sept. 22, 1980); Comment, Federal Common Law in Interstate Water Pollution
Disputes, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 141, 144 [hereinafter cited as Water Pollution Disputes].
For four years Illinois had attempted to resolve the controversy pursuant to the
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970) (repealed 1972). Water Pollution Disputes, supra.
at 14445. Enforcement under the FVPCA was cumbersome and time consuming.
rarely resulting in court action. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 21, at 372-75, MeTher-
nia, supra note 25, at 199-200; Amendments, supra note 21, at 674-75.
31. 406 U.S. at 93. Illinois alleged that the defendants were discharging "'some
200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage" per day. Id.
32. The grant of original jurisdiction in U.S. Const. art. 11I, § 2. el. 2, is im-
plemented in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). This section provides, in part, that "'[t]he
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of ... [ajll controversies
between two or more States." Id. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
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Court. The Court concluded, however, that the defendants were
merely political subdivisions of a state.1 This distinction permitted
the Court to explore potential alternative forums,15 its jurisdiction
over suits involving only one state being non-exclusive.' The Court
reasoned that the finding of an adequate alternative forum would
allow it to avoid the burden of trying this and similar original actions '"
33. 406 U.S. at 93.
34. Id. at 97. It is well-settled that a political subdivision is not the equivalent of
a state. E.g., Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933); Cowles v. Mercer County,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868). Illinois also attempted to join the State of Wisconsin as
a necessary party defendant. 406 U.S. at 94. Although, under appropriate pleadings,
Wisconsin could have been joined as a defendant, its joinder was not mandatory. Id.
at 97. If Wisconsin had been joined, it appears the Court would have heard the case
because, only six weeks after Illinois was decided, the Court accepted jurisdiction
over an interstate water pollution dispute involving two states. Vermont v. New
York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972).
35. 406 U.S. at 98. The Court said that it would "honor" its original jurisdiction
but "only in appropriate cases." Id. at 93. What is appropriate "necessarily involves
the availability of another forum." Id.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1976). This section provides, in part, that the Su-
preme Court "shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of. . . [a]ll actions or
proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State." Id. Traditionally, the
Court construed its original jurisdiction as self-executing. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 478, 491-92 (1854); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,
332-33 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). Later cases
upheld the power of Congress to grant concurrent jurisdiction to lower federal courts
over cases arising under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Ames v. Kansas,
111 U.S. 449, 469 (18S4); Gittings v. Crawford, 10 F. Cas. 447, 449 (D. Md. 1838)
(No. 5465). Federal courts, therefore, potentially have jurisdiction over cases involv-
ing a state, but such jurisdiction is not provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1976). C.
Wright, supra note 5, at 502. See generally Hart & Weehsler, supra note 6, at
242-87; C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3525-
3528 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
37. 406 U.S. at 93-94. The burden that original jurisdiction suits imposed on the
Supreme Court is readily apparent from earlier cases In Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963), for example, an interstate water dispute required 22 hours of oral
argument, involved two successive Special Masters, and resulted in over 25,000
pages of transcripts. Id. at 551. Another interstate water dispute required 11 years
for trial and argument before a final decree was issued. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419, 496 (1922). Enforcement and supervision of the final decree required
another 35 years of the Court's attention. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494
(1932) (suit to enforce 1922 decree); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936)
(modification of 1922 decree); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940) (suit for
contempt of 1936 decree; decree modified); Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953
(1957) (new decree on the merits). In a third interstate dispute, Georgia v. Tennes-
see Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), a modifiable decree issued in 1907 was finally
vacated by the Court in 1938. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 304 U.S. 5,16
(1938). See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 6, at 287; Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 697-98 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Original Jurisdiction]. The task involved in an original suit is
especially onerous in light of the rising number of cases on the Court's docket. See
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while still fulfilling its obligation under article III of the United States
Constitution.'
Interpreting the district courts' federal question jurisdiction' to in-
clude federal common law claims,4 the Court held that Illinois' cause
of action presented a federal question and was adjudicable in federal
district court."1 Permitting Illinois to pursue a federal common law
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 57, 310 (1973) (Court had 4,636
cases on its docket in 1972). The resulting time pressures have forced the Court to
reconsider its role as a trial court. Griswold, The Supreme Court's Case Load. Cicil
Rights and Other Problems, 1973 U. I11. L.F. 615, 626-27.
38. 406 U.S. at 93. Article III of the United States Constitution provides, in part,
that "[iun all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. "[Ilt is a time-honored
maxim ... that a court possessed of jurisdiction generally must exercise it." Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971) (citation omitted). The Court
has "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403
(1821). The Court, however, also has an obligation to promote and further "the cur-
rent role of [the] Court ... as the final federal appellate court." Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 499 (1971). Therefore, the Court has exercised its
discretion to deny its original jurisdiction. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797
(1976) (per curiam) (appropriate state forum); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401
U.S. 493, 501 (1971) (same); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939)
(appropriate lower federal forum). See generally Original Jurisdiction, supra note 37,
at 694-700.
39. Federal district courts have general federal question jurisdiction over all civil
actions that arise "under the ... laws ... of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1976).
40. 406 U.S. at 100. The Court concluded that '§ 1331 jurisdiction will support
claims founded upon federal common law." id. Substantial lower court precedent
existed for the Court's holding. Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971); Ivy
Broadcasting Co. v. AT&T, 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); Murphy v. Colonial Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 816 (1959); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.
1952). The Illinois Court apparently overruled its decision in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), which held that the federal maritime
common law did not arise under the laws of the United States. Id. at 359-80. Gen-
eral maritime law, however, may be distinguished from federal common law. At the
time 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) was enacted, admiralty courts provided an adequate
federal forum for maritime rights, and the Romero Court found little indication that
Congress intended the district courts as alternative forums for maritime claims. 358
U.S. at 369; see 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (admiralty jurisdiction statute). Extension of
the federal question jurisdiction to federal common law claims has been a subject of
debate. See Woods & Reed, Tile Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Qual-
ity: Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 691 (1970), Interstate
Pollution, supra note 3; 50 Tex. L. Rev. 183 (1971); 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 597.
41. 406 U.S. at 99-100. Diversity jurisdiction is not available to a state because a
state is not considered a citizen of itself within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976). Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894). One commenta-
tor, however, has suggested that a state could commence a diversity action by utiliz-
ing its state agencies or attorney general as the lead plaintiff. Interstate Pollution.
supra note 3, at 1459.
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action in district court" was deemed necessary to protect two distinct
federal interests -purity of the nation's water supply43 and states'
quasi-sovereign interests in interstate water." The Court noted that
the existence of a federal common law remedy would be consistent
with and, in fact, supplement the policy of the FWPCA by providing
relief for violations of the Act. ' Nevertheless, the Court warned that
"new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt
the field of federal common law of nuisance."46
B. The CWA
Six months after the Illinois decision, Congress passed the CWA.
47
Its passage was the culmination of more than three years of delibera-
42. One commentator has dismissed as dicta the Court's choice of federal com-
mon law as the rule of decision. F. Grad, supra note 12, § 3.03. It would seem,
however, that the Court's holding was premised upon finding a federl right in favor
of Illinois to sustain a lower federal court's jurisdiction. See notes 39-41 supra and
accompanying text. Therefore, the choice of lav was crucial to the Court's decision.
"A court's stated and ... necessary basis for deciding does not become dictum
.... Friendly, supra note 6, at 385.
43. 406 U.S. at 101-02. The Court cited the broad range of existing federal stat-
utes dealing with interstate waters as demonstrating a federal interest in the nation's
waters. Id.
44. Id. at 105-07. The Court noted that a public nuisance created upon an inter-
state body of water could 'amount to a casus belli for a State lower down, unless
removed,' " id. at 107 (quoting Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906)), and
that resort to the peaceful means of litigation to protect its quasi-sovereign interest
was a rationale for federal court jurisdiction over such disputes. Id. at 107-08 & n.9;
see Stewart, supra note 24, at 1229.
45. 406 U.S. at 103-04. The Court stated that "[t]he remedy sought by Illinois is
not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress. Yet the remedies
which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available." Id.
at 103. The Court has implied injunctive relief for violations of a similar regulatory
scheme. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1967)
(Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1976)); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (same); Sanitary Dist, v.
United States, 266 U.S. 405, 428 (1925) (same).
46. 406 U.S. at 107. The legislative supremacy of Congress is well recognized.
E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (federal maritime
common law preempted by Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767
(1976)); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 115 (1972) (federal com-
mon law of nuisance may have been preempted by Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 563 (1963)
(federal common law of equitable apportionment preempted by Boulder Canyon Pro-
ject Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617a-617t (1976)); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F.
Supp. 573, 579 (1972) (federal common law of nuisance preempted by Noise Control
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), modified on other
grounds, 541 F.2d 442 (1976); see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 10-11; Stewart, supra
note 24, at 1228.
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). The CWA was enacted on October 18, 1972.
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. "The (CWA], although technically amending the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965, for all practical purposes replaces all
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tion and compromise on how best to improve the FWVPCA."' The
stated purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."" Congress
declared it the "national [goal] to eliminate the discharge of pollutants
into the waters of the United States by 1985." ''  Furthermore, the
CWA required, as an interim objective, the achievement of water
quality sufficient for the protection and propagation of wildlife by
1981. n' To achieve these lofty goals, Congress created a legislative-
administrative partnership, with Congress supplying the objectives
and general guidelines and an expert administrative agency admin-
istering and implementing the specific regulatory programs.1
The CWA directs the administrator of the EPA to set increasingly
stringent effluent limitations' on a uniform nationwide basis.'-' The
federal effluent limitations promulgated by the EPA would then con-
stitute the minimum level of pollution control under the CVA."
When local conditions require, the EPA may set stricter regional
standards to protect public water supplies, wildlife and agricultural
uses, and recreational needs, provided the needs outweigh the eco-
nomic costs.'
To balance the interest in pollution free water with the competing
interest in economic prosperity, Congress expressly provided for a
gradual compliance timetable.,, Additionally, the CWA directs the
administrator, when setting effluent limitations, to consider the tech-
federal water pollution control statutes." MeThernia. supra note 2:5. at 202. For a
discussion of the effect of the CWA, see Ipsen & Raisch. supra note 21. MeThernia.
supra note 25; Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.
77 Dick. L. Rev. 459 (1973); Amendments. supra note 21.
48. Ipsen & Raisch, supra note 21, at 374-75.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1972). reprinted in 1 Legislati'e
History, supra note 1, at 758.
51. Id., reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 75S.
52. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1361 (1976).
53. Id. § 1311, construed in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n. 101 S Ct.
295, 300 (1980); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train. 430 U.S. 112. 121 1977),
54. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1316 (1976); S. Rep. No. 1236. 92d Cong.. 2d Sess.
126 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668. 3803, reprinted
in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 309; see Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(A) (1976). This section requires all states to meet the
minimum federal effluent standards promulgated by the EPA. Id. Set generally
Amendments, supra note 21, at 717-19.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
57. Id. § 1362(17). The schedule of compliance sets a period within which a
polluter must take remedial actions to comply with the effluent standards set in the
applicable permit. Id.
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nological feasibility of compliance." The applicable effluent limita-
tions are then incorporated into a national permit system, imposing
legal obligations on each pollution discharger. 9 It is unlawful for any
person to discharge pollutants without obtaining and complying with
a permit.6" In accordance with the policies of the CWA, all in-
terested persons who may be affected by a discharger are entitled to
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the issuance of any
permit."
Congress also recognized "the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent . . . pollution."'62 It enlisted the states in its battle
against pollution by permitting the states to assume all regulatory
duties over their intrastate waters provided the EPA has approved
the program as complying with all federal standards." Additionally,
states are empowered to impose unilaterally more stringent standards
upon their waterways as a matter of state law. 4
58. Id. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Congress chose to link the effluent stan-
dards to the ability of polluters to obtain pollution control technology. Id. Section
1311(b) provides a two-step procedure by which the administrator sets increasingly
stringent standards. The first step, to be accomplished by 1977, requires polluters to
obtain "the best practicable control technology currently available." Id. §
1311(b)(1)(A). The second step, to be accomplished by 1987, requires polluters to
meet standards based on the application of "the best available technology economi-
cally achieveable." Id. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
59. Id. § 1342 (1976), construed in EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976), construed in Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation,
445 U.S. 198, 202 (1980).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1), (b)(3)-(b)(5), 0) (1976). construed in Costle v. Pacific
Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198, 202 (1980). EPA decisions regarding the setting of
federal effluent standards are subject to circuit court review. Id. § 1369(b)(1) (1976),
construed in Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle, No. 79-1183, slip op. at 10-15
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 1980); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018,
1036 (4th Cir. 1976), modified on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American
Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
63. Id. § 1342(a)-(d), construed in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S.
193, 193-94 (1980); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 119-20
& n.7 (1977); EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 206-08
(1976). To institute its own permit program, a state must follow specific EPA proce-
dures. 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.1-.62 (1979). Once the agency approves the program, the
federal permit program is suspended. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1976). The agency con-
tinues to receive copies of state permit applications and retains the right to veto state
permits. Id. § 1342(d). It may, however, waive this notice requirement, id.
§ 1342(e), and the responsibility for supervising state programs. Id. § 1342(d)(3).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976). State standards are subject only to initial EPA
approval. Id. § 1342. Further action by a state is subject only to the discretionary
approval of the EPA. District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 909 n.24 (2d
Cir. 1976). In contrast, the federal administrator may only require more stringent
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Most importantly, the CWA strengthens the enforcement provi-
sions of the FWPCA. The CWA imposes criminal penalties on
violators " and authorizes the EPA to bring civil proceedings "for
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary
injunction."'6 7  Congress also provided for two private rights of
action68 applicable to an individual as well as to a "State, municipal-
ity, commission, or political subdivision." '  Any citizen' is empow-
ered to bring an action against a person alleged to have violated any
effluent limitation 7 l or against the federal administrator for failure to
perform any non-discretionary duty.-, Courts may order the enforce-
ment of the effluent standard,n require the administrator to perform
his statutory duty,74 and impose civil penalties against the violator.n
federal standards if necessitated and cost justified, 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b) (1976), and
then only after public hearings, id. § 1312(b)(1), and judicial review. Id. § 1369tb).
65. McThernia, supra note 25, at 204; Amendments, supra note 21, at 698. Wa-
ter Pollution Disputes, supra note 30, at 144.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1976). The criminal penalties include fines of up to
$25,000 per day for violations and imprisonment of up to one year for willful or
negligent violations. Id., construed in United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d
1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1979) (first use of CWA's criminal sanctions), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1074 (1980). Despite the ability of the government to seek criminal sanctions
under § 1319(c), the government has relied primarily upon civil restraints. Id.,
Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution": The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal
Sanctions, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 835, 836 (1973).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1976). The CWA also provides the administrator with
emergency power to seek immediate abatement of any discharge endangering liveli-
hood or health regardless of statutory compliance. Id. § 1364.
68. Id. § 1365(a).
69. Id. § 1362(5), construed in Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Adm'n,
541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976) defines "citizen" as "'a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. The legislative history explicitly
states that a person is adversely affected only if there is injury in fact. S. Rep. No.
1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145-46 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 3776, 3822-23, reprinted in I Legislative History, supra note 1. at 328-29. The
injury could be to one's "[a]esthetic and environmental well-being," but it must be
demonstrated "that the party seeking review [is] himself among the injured." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972); see Currie, Judicial Review Under
Federal Pollution Laws, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1221, 1273 (1977).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1976), construed in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1976), construed in EPA v. Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976), construed in United States v. Pennsylvania Envt'!
Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d 1273, 1276, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1978); Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Train, 394 F. Supp. 211, 215-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976), construed in Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425
F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp.
1181, 1182, 1187-80 (D. Ariz. 1975).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976), construed in United States v. Cutter Laboratories
Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1295, 1297-98 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train,
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II. PROTECTION OF THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN CLEAN
WATER: PREEMPTION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A fundamental and important principle of the American system of
government is the doctrine of separation of powers."6 With division
of power, no governmental department can obtain arbitrary and
unlimited strength. 7  To prevent judicial encroachment upon the
functions of the legislature, the separation of powers doctrine has
been scrupulously observed by the Supreme Court.7 Courts are not
free to substitute their own notions of how best to protect the in-
terests of the nation once Congress has provided a statutory formula
for dealing with a perceived federal problem.79 "It is not for [courts]
to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the Nation's
law-making body." '  Although courts have the power to fashion in-
terstitial federal law 8' to effectuate the policy expressed by
394 F. Supp. 211, 215-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1976).
76. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590-91
(1949); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933); Springer v. Govern-
ment of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 200 (1928); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192
(1880). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 126-27
(1978); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 2-1 to -4 (1978); Clark, Separation
of Powers, 11 Willamette L.J. 1 (1974); Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the
Separation of Powers, tO Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Symposium, Separation
of Powers, 52 Ind. L.J. 311 (1977).
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) ("The Framers [of the Constitution]
regarded the checks and balances [of a] tripartite Federal Government as a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment • . . of one branch at the expense of
the other."); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91 (1947) ("By [tile]
mutual checks and balances by and between the branches of government, democracy
undertakes to preserve the liberties of the people from excessive concentrations of
authority."); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401 (1856) ("[N]cither the
legislative, executive, nor judicial departments of the Government can lawfully exer-
cise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the Constitution.").
78. E.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); Schnell v. Peter Eckrich &
Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 263 (1961); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 352 (1904); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903); Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 62.3, 660-61 (1887).
79. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once Congress, exercising its dele-
gated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is . .. for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (A court has "no authority to substitute [its] views
for those expressed by Congress in a duly enacted statute."). The courts do not sit to
revise legislative action. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582, 603 (1949); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota cx rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585,
599 (1915). Unless there is a clear abuse of congressional power, the courts have no
authority to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature. Cant v. Oklahoma
City, 289 U.S. 98, 102 (1933); New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 269 U.S. 244, 248 (1925).
80. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 663 (1951).
81. Mishkin, supra note 6, at 800. "[E]ffective Constitutionalism requires recog-
nition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'jndi-
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Congress,82 they "are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so
thoroughly that [a statute] becomes meaningless.""
It is clear that the CWA constitutes the federal law for maintaining
the purity of the nation's waters. Because of the CWA's comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme and pervasive enforcement procedures," the
federal interest in the nation's water supply is effectively protected.5
Therefore, the need for a federal common law cause of action solely
to further the federal interest in clean water no longer exists.
cial legislation,' rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially [to] effectuate the
statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress." Id. This power arises because
"Congress must often deal with ... problems in a generic fashion." Stewart, supra
note 24, at 1230. When "Congress has . . . provided enough federal law ...
appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences." United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960). When fashioning federal
common law, however, courts must follow, not formulate, congressional policy by
finding a congressional judgment that federal law should govern. Competence of
Federal Courts, supra note 6, at 1090; Federal Common Law, supra note 6, at 1522.
"The judicial function to be exercised in construing a statute is limited to ascertaining
the intention of the legislature therein expressed." Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548,
554 (1925). As the Illinois Court recognized, the federal common law is controlled by
the statutory scheme of Congress, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 10"2
(1972), and must be consistent with that scheme. Id. at 103-04. The role of the
courts in fashioning interstitial federal common law has received considerable atten-
tion. See generally R. Crampton, P. Currie, & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws Cases -
Comments - Questions 929-50 (2d ed. 1975); Hart & Vechsler, supra note 6, at
756-832; Mishkin, supra note 6; Choice of Law, supra note 6.
82. E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 (1965); Local 721,
United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S.
247, 250 (1964); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962); Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Deitrick v. Greancy, 309 U.S.
190, 200 (1940); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939). When
the intent of Congress is ambiguous or not readily ascertainable, a court fashioning
federal law must make two determinations. First, it must decide whether the act of
Congress demonstrates a substantial federal interest in the party's claim requiring the
application of federal law. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580, 592-93 (1973); Choice of Law, supra note 6, at 133 n.2; Competence of Federal
Courts, supra note 6, at 1099; Rules of Decision, supra note 6, at 1441-42. Second, if
the federal interest in the litigation is substantial, the court must then fashion a rule
of decision. Mishkin, supra note 6, at 803; Comment, Adopting State Law as the
Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 825 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Adopting State Law].
83. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
84. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975); see notes 52-75 supra and
accompanying text.
85. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 532 t8th Cir.
1975), modified on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); F. Grad, supra note
12, § 3.03; Zener, supra note 16, at 790; 1977 Wash. L.Q. 164, 175-77.
86. Under similar regulatory schemes, courts have held that federal common law
is preempted. See note 46 supra.
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Some courts, however, have ignored the administrative and judicial
procedures provided under the CWA and have continued to apply
federal common law. 7 In National Sea Clammers Association v. City
of New York," for example, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's holding that a federal common law cause of action was not
available to private parties.8 9 The dispute involved the discharge of
nutrient rich sludge by several New Jersey and New York
municipalities. 90 The discharge caused a massive increase in algae
that, after decomposition, caused damage to marine life upon which
the plaintiffs depended for their livelihood. 9 The plaintiffs, however,
failed to provide notice of their intent to sue as required by the
CWA,' thus precluding their injunctive remedy under the Act. The
Third Circuit, circumventing this statutory bar, validated the associa-
tion's federal nuisance cause of action as an alternative basis for in-
junctive relief' and remanded the case to the district court.9 '
87. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for
cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S. July 28, 1980) (No. 80-126); National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub norn.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314
(1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12), City of Evansville v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025
(1980); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 926 (1980) (No. 79-408); Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F.
Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978); see California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jen-
nings, 594 F.2d 181, 193 (9th Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); United
States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974) (dicta), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 363 F. Supp. 110,
119-20 (D. Vt.) (prior to regulations), aff'd mem., 487 F 2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
88. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert, granted sub nor. Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754,
79-1760 & 80-12).
89. Id. at 1235-36.
90. Id. at 1224-25. The EPA, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the
New York and New Jersey Departments of Environmental Conservation, and seven
New York and New Jersey Sewerage Commissions were named as defendants. Id. at
1222.
91. Id. at 1224-25.
92. Id. at 1225. The CWA requires a citizen to give 60 days notice to the admin-
istrator, state officials, and the alleged violator before art action in district court may
be commenced. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
93. 616 F.2d at 1234. The court also implied a cause of action for damages under
the CWA. Id. at 1228-31. Courts imply civil remedies to advance the overall purpose
of legislation. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (Federal Election Campaign Act,
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-79z-6 (1976)); Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976)). In
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court provided a four-factor test to
guide lower courts in creating private rights of action. Id. at 78. The Court, how-
ever, has noted that the Cort test was designed merely as a guide and that "[tihe
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create . . .a private cause of
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The Third Circuit's decision to ignore the carefully drafted provi-
sions for injunctive relief goes beyond its limited lawmaking powers
and constitutes a judicial incursion into the decision-making powers of
a coordinate branch of government. The procedural requirements im-
posed by Congress were not designed as mere impediments to
relief.9 They embody an explicit congressional policy. The notice
requirements were designed to "encourage and provide for agency
enforcement"" and to prevent inconsistent judicial decrees that
might result if both a citizen and the EPA brought actions
simultaneously.1 Prior notice permits the government to institute
administrative action against a violator before the notice period
expires, 9 thus obviating the need for private litigation. Permitting
citizens to bring a federal action unconstrained by the notice require-
ments defeats the congressional compromise between general public
enforcement and central agency control l and renders the citizen suit
action." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); accord. Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979). Under this
analysis, the Seventh Circuit, in City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling,
Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), held that no
private cause of action could be implied by the CWA. This issue is on appeal to the
Supreme Court. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n
101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12). See generally Note,
A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, 48 Fordhan L. Rev. 505 (1980).
Note, Environmental Protection: A Limited Expansion of the Citizen's Role, 12
Washburn L.J. 54 (1972).
94. 616 F.2d at 1238.
95. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1972). reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745, reprinted in 2 Legislative History. supra note
1, at 1498. (The notice provision "should not require notice that places impossible or
unnecessary burdens on citizens" but merely require "information necessary to give a
clear indication of the citizens' intent.").
96. Id. at 79, reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News at 3745, reprinted
in 2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1497.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1976) (no suit may be initiated if United States is
diligently pursuing an action against alleged violator). The potential for inconsistent
results is demonstrated by the National Sea Clamrners litigation. The EPA brought
an enforcement action against one defendant, Westchester County, and obtained an
order establishing a schedule for compliance. EPA Petition for Certiorari at 15 n.5,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, No. 80-12 (U.S.,
filed July 3, 1980). If a federal common law injunction is granted, the order procured
by the EPA will effectively be overruled. Id.
98. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note
1, at 1498; see City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975)
(discussing similar notice requirements contained in citizen suit provisions of Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
927 (1976); Steinberg, Is the Citizen Suit a Substitute for the Class Action in En-
vironmental Litigation? An Examination of the Clean Air Act of 1970 Citizen Suit
Provision, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 107, 132 (1974) (same).
99. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The Moragne
Court cautioned against the use of common law when "the legislature ... in order
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provisions meaningless.'00 A court is not free to devise its own rules
in a statutory field merely because its sense of justice impels it to do
so;"' l it "cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted." ',
Another instance of judicial encroachment upon the legislative
scheme is the use of federal common law by some courts to invalidate
conduct permitted by the EPA."°  In National Sea Clammers, for
example, the City of New York had obtained a permit from the EPA
to dredge and dump spoil in the offshore waters of the Atlantic
Ocean.10°  The court, however, ignored the permit and allowed the
association to pursue its federal common law cause of action.1"5
Courts that have authorized federal common law claims despite a
defendant's compliance with EPA regulations have misinterpreted
to promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe[s] with particularity the compass of
the legislative aim." Id. at 392.
100. EPA Petition for Certiorari at 15, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, No. 80-12 (U.S., filed July 3, 1980); see City of High-
land Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 691 (7th Cir. 1975) (notice provisions of Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), designed to promote agency en-
forcement and cannot be ignored), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(ignoring notice provision would defeat congressional intent).
101. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) ("[I1n our constitutional system the
commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt con-
gressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the
public weal.' ").
102. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959). "In the area covered
by [a] statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of
damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of
beneficiaries." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). Simi-
larly, courts should not be free to prescribe rules for obtaining a federal injunction
different from those prescribed by Congress. 14 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 767,
783-84 (1973).
103. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12);
California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 193, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp.
1215, 1218-19 (D. Mont. 1979); cf. United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 363 F.
Supp. 110, 120-21 (D. Vt.) (compliance with FWPCA does not preclude federal com-
mon law action), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1973).
104. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1224-25
(3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12).
Plaintiffs did not dispute that the defendant's conduct was approved by the EPA and
the Army Corps of Engineers. EPA Brief for Appellees at 16, National Sea Clammers
Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clamners Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314
(1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12).
105. 616 F.2d at 1233.
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Illinois. Although the Illinois decision recognized that the environ-
mental statutes would not necessarily define the outer boundaries of
federal common law,' ° the Court was merely attempting to provide
federal remedies for violations of congressional policy when legislation
failed to supply an explicit statutory sanction. "  The Court did not
create a substantive body of law existing outside of a statute, but an
interstitial remedy to effectuate the policy of the FWPCA."' "There
is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence
and rewriting [standards] that Congress has affirmatively and specifi-
cally enacted." " The setting of specific uniform federal standards is
the ultimate decision of the EPA pursuant to its congressionally dele-
gated authority."' The substitution of judicially created standards,
under the guise of an alternative federal cause of action, neither was
intended by, nor is consistent with, the CWA."' Furthermore, it is
an invasion of Congress' power for a court to find conduct authorized
by the EPA illegal.12
106. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 n.5 (1972).
107. Id. at 103. The Court has supplied federal common law remedies in other
instances when legislation had failed to do so. E.g., United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-426 (1976)); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957) (Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976)).
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (Federal Reserve Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1976)); Deitrick v. Creaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1936) (National Bank-
ing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24-342 (1976)).
108. 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 795, 806-07 (1974); 14 B.C. Indus. & Com.
L. Rev. 767, 781 (1973); 26 Emory L.J. 432, 445 (1977). Contra, Federal Common
Law Remedies, supra note 7, at 558-59; 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 246, 253 (1977).
109. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1316 (1976); see S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
60 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3726, reprinted in
2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1478.
111. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note
1, at 1497 ("Section [1365] would not substitute a 'common law' or court-developed
definition of water quality."); S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1236 (1972),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3745, reprinted in I Legisla-
tive History, supra note 1, at 309 ("Mhe intent of the Conferees is that effluent
limitations ... be as uniform as possible. The Administrator is expected to be pre-
cise in his guidelines ...."). Both the EPA and Congress "'felt it very important
that citizen's suits be directed to enforcing standards set by law and regulation rather
than hypothetical standards which are not related to statutory and regulatory enact-
ment." Proposed Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: Hearings
on H.R. 11896 Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 239
(1972), reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1153 (statement of Russel
Train).
112. See New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 440-41 (D.
Conn. 1979). In Costle, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant power station maintained
a federal common law nuisance by burning high sulphur coal. The court noted,
however, that the relief sought was, "in effect, an attack upon the validity of the
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The danger presented by this type of judicial activism has not gone
unnoticed.' In Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train,"4 the court stated that
it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal
common law which proscribes conduct which the [CWAJ
legitimates .... While the state courts are free to apply state nui-
sance law more rigidly, a federal court . .. may not turn to a sup-
posed body of federal common law to impose stricter standards
than the statute provides."5
Moreover, a court that orders the immediate cessation of polluting
conduct destroys the economic considerations built into the CWA
permit system." 6 The result may be economic harm as detrimental
to the general welfare as the pollution itself."7  Courts should not
EPA-approved variance . . . , [and thus] a challenge to the legality of the limitation
itself." Id. at 441 n.21. Furthermore, the court noted that, under the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1976), the plaintiffs could have achieved administratively what
they sought under the federal common law. 475 F. Supp. at 441 n.21. Similarly,
persons injured by water pollution have a right to proceed administratively to attack
any permit or standard set by the EPA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1976), and to obtain
judicial review of any final administrative decision. Id. Failure to comply with the
administrative procedures bars judicial review. Id. § 1369(b)(2). Therefore, federal
common law actions circumventing the administrative procedures of the CWA should
be precluded. Zener, supra note 16, at 790 & n.460; see McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969) (courts should not supply judicial relief when adequate
administrative remedies exist); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 425
(1965) ("[t]he exhaustion doctrine [of administrative remedies] is ... an expression of
executive and administrative autonomy").
113. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976); F. Grad, supra note 12, § 3.03; Zener, supra note 16, at
789-90; 26 Emory L.J. 432, 454-55 (1977); see New England Legal Foundation v.
Costle, 475 F. Supp. 425, 441-42 (D. Conn. 1979).
114. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976). In Jones Falls, city and state officials, operat-
ing a public waste treatment plant, permitted sewage to overflow. Id. at 1007. Be-
cause the overflow did not violate the limitations of their CWA permit, no claim
under the statute was possible. Id. at 1010.
115. Id. at 1009 (footnote omitted).
116. See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b) (1976) (Prior to establishing more stringent federal
standards, the administrator must "hold a public hearing to determine ... the eco-
nomic and social costs of achieving any such . . . limitations."); S. Rep. No. 414, 92d
Cong., ist Sess. 47 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668,
3713, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1465 (Full weight should
be given to "the projected economic costs of establishing" more stringent standards
under this section.); id. at 43, reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3668, 3709, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 1461 ("Ihe Com-
mittee recognizes the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution immediately.").
117. Cf. Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir.
1975) (permanent injunction not granted because it would close auto shredding plant
important to local economy); Stockdale v. Agrico Chem. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244, 261
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (permanent injunction not granted because it would close phos-
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disrupt the careful balance of interests entrusted to the expert admin-
istrative processes of the EPA.'
The citizen suit provision for injunctive relief must be deemed the
exclusive federal remedy for pollution abatement."' The CWA,
however, does not supply a cause of action for damages incurred as a
result of pollution.'2 Nevertheless, Congress' failure to provide for
compensatory relief should not justify a reflexive creation of a federal
common law action. A common sense reading of the statute's savings
clause, and its legislative history, indicates that Congress did provide
a mechanism for compensating injuries caused by polluting activities.
The savings clause of the citizens' suit provisions declares that the
CWA shall not "restrict any right which any person ...may have
under any statute or common lav." m' The legislative history of the
clause states that "[c]ompliance with [the] ... Act would not be a
phate plant important to local economy); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d
219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1970) (permanent injunction
not granted because it would close $45,000,000 cement plant employing 300 per-
sons).
118. See Note, Federal Common Law Suits to Abate Interstate Air Pollution, 4
Harv. Envt'l L. Rev. 117, 131 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Air Pollution]. EPA regula-
tions based on the "best available technology" should not be ignored in favor of
common law theories of nuisance. Id. Water pollution control requires "a complex
balancing analysis of factors that include economic, technical, and other considera-
tions" requiring scientific expertise. 118 Cong. Rec. 33701 (1972), reprinted in 1
Legislative History, supra note 1, at 181 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); see Crampton &
Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or Promise?. 2 Ecol. L.Q. 407,
413-14 (1972). Litigation without prior administrative action is not the most rational
approach to pollution control, Hines, supra note 11, at 200-01, because nuisance law
does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for dealing with the complex
problems associated with water pollution. Interstate Pollution, supra note 3. at 1451-
52; see Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1096 (2d Cir. 1977) (analy-
sis of technological and scientific criterion of Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7640
(Supp. II 1978), sensibly delegated to EPA); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 223, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15 (1970) (courts lack
adequate resources to develop a comprehensive means of controlling pollution). Be-
cause the EPA has "unique experience and expertise," American Meat Inst. v. EPA,
526 F.2d 442, 450 n. 16 (7th Cir. 1975), courts should defer to its specialized knowl-
edge in determining effluent standards and limitations. See United States v. Western
P.R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64-65 (1956) (role of judiciary better suited to review ing legal
issues after factual determinations have been made by federal agencies).
119. See notes 70-74, 87-118 supra and accompanying text.
120. The EPA maintains that the CWA was designed, not as a remedial scheme,
but as a preventive method of controlling pollution for the general public. EPA Petition
for Certiorari at 12, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, No. 80-12 (U.S., filed July 3, 1980). Private actions for damages generally are
not intended under such schemes. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
690 & n.13 (1979); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205, 216-17 (1934);
Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
285, 291-92 (1963).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
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defense to a common law action for pollution damages." 121 Such a
result could only be obtained if Congress intended the application of
standards of conduct other than those fixed by the CWA. Under the
statute, state law is not only expressly preserved," it is the only law
permitted to impose more stringent standards of conduct than those
promulgated by the EPA.1 4 This realization, coupled with the
CWA's policy to preserve the state's primary role in controlling pollu-
tion, indicates that application of state common law was intended for
parties seeking damages."
Furthermore, savings clauses can only preserve rights and rem-
edies antedating a statute.' The CWA could not have saved a feder-
al common law cause of action for damages that did not exist. Unlike
the well-established federal common law created by the Supreme
Court to protect the quasi-sovereign interests of the states from inter-
state pollution, 2 ' there was no established federal right to seek dam-
ages for polluting conduct when the CWA was enacted. 12Therefore,
122. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3668, 3746-47, reprinted in 2 Legislative History, supra
note 1, at 1499.
123. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370 (1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 136 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 823 ("Commit-
tee rejected in most instances suggestions for preemption by the Federal Govern-
ment and preempted the States only where the situation warranted it based upon
urgent need for uniformity such as in section [1322(o] relating to marine sanitation
devices.").
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976); see note 64 supra. Unlike the federal statute, which
is designed to eliminate pollution gradually, state common law actions can be
directed at immediate abatement as a matter of state law. People ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611, 352 N.E.2d 225, 228-29 (1976);
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 360, 370,
332 N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976).
125. The well-established principles of state nuisance law should provide an
adequate mechanism for redressing private injuries from water pollution. See gener-
ally Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington,
5 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 32 (1970); Juergensmeyer, supra note 11; Maloney, Judi-
cial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common-Law Remedies, 25
Vand. L. Rev. 145 (1972); Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control
of Air Pollution, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 107 (1968); Comment, A Private Nuisance
Approach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 86 (1980); Note,
Private Nuisance Law: Protection of the Individual's Environmental Rights, 8 Suffolk
U.L. Rev. 1162 (1974); Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 11.
126. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1014
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); EPA Petition for Certiorari at 12,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, No. 80-12 (U.S.,
filed July 3, 1980); Ruud, The Savings Clause-Some Problems in Construction and
Drafting, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 285, 300, 303 (1955).
127. See pt. III infra.
128. Even if Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), established a pri-
vate federal common law cause of action for water pollution, see notes 106-108 supra
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in drafting the savings clause, it is logical to assume that Congress
was referring to state, not federal, law.
Arguably, the phrase "any . . . common law"12' is sufficiently am-
biguous to present a choice of law question. " 'In deciding whether
rules of federal common law should be fashioned .... a significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state
law . . . must first be specifically shown.' "'" Absent such a conflict,
state law applies. 3 '
The CWA clearly provides that state law meeting federal minimum
standards is not only consistent with, but, under certain circum-
stances, actually supplants federal law."1 Moreover, utilization of
state law to determine damages has little or no effect upon the
federal regulatory scheme. A claim for damages, unlike enforcement
and accompanying text, Congress could not have intended to save it because Illinois
was decided after passage of the CWA. The CWA was passed by the Senate on
November 2, 1971, 117 Cong. Rec. 38888 (1971). and by the House on March 29,
1972. 118 Cong. Rec. 10831 (1972). Illinois was handed down on April 24, 1972. 406
U.S. at 91.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
130. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977) (quoting \Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)) (emphasis omitted). State law is presumed
to apply unless federal concerns would conflict with its use. See Choice of Law,
supra note 6, at 149 n.67. "[T]he inner logic of the federal system requires state
solutions whenever they are feasible." Federal Common Law, supra note 6, at 1517
(footnote omitted); see Mishkin, supra note 6, at 814 & n.64; Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 54445 (1954); Competence of Federal
Courts, supra note 6, at 1085.
131. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1973);
Wechsler, supra note 130, at 544; Choice of Law, supra note 6, at 149 n.67, Adopting
State Law, supra note 82, at 824-27. "That Congress may have constitutional power
to make federal law displacing state substantive policy does not imply an equal range
of power for federal judges." Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The
Thread, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1682, 1683 (1974). "The political logic of federalism . . .
supports placing the burden of persuasion on those urging national action." Wech-
sler, supra note 130, at 545. Only when a substantial federal interest exists in the
litigation will state lav be displaced. Choice of Law, supra note 6. at 144-45.
132. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(c), 1370 (1976). When a state institutes its own permit
program under § 1342(b), the permits become "State, not Federal, actions." 118
Cong. Rec. 33761 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 262
(remarks of Rep. Wright); see District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 863
(D.C. Cir. 1980); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 838-39 (7th Cir.
1977); Mianus River Preservation Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976),
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. United States Steel Corp., 30 III. App. 3d 360, 371,
332 N.E.2d 426, 434 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976). If the state sets
effluent limitations under 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976), they are enforced by the state as
a matter of state law. Id. § 1342(b)(7); see Amendments, supra note 21, at 714-20.
Furthermore, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976) has been construed to allow states to impose
more stringent effluent standards through state common law nuisance actions. People
ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 111. App. 3d 607, 611, 352 N.E.2d 225,
228-29 (1976).
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actions brought pursuant to the CWA, fails to implicate directly the
federal interest in controlling water pollution." A damage action,
presenting factual questions of injury and causation,' is far removed
from the regulation of water pollution. The question whether pri-
vate parties may obtain damages involves the federal interest only
insofar as it might be thought to advance indirectly pollution
control. 36  The federal interest in a damage action, however, is so
remote and speculative that no significant conflict exists and use of
state law is appropriate.'
133. Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd
mem. sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.
1977).
134. J. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy 209-10, 215-16 (1971); W. Prosser,
supra note 11, § 88; Zener, supra note 16, at 788; Nuances of Nuisance, supra note
11, at 66-70. Generally, to recover damages in private nuisance the plaintiff must
show (1) that a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of his land
occurred; (2) that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable or intentional; and (3)
that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the interference. Note,
State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 712, 717
(1968).
135. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977). The Miree Court found
that, although a damage award might further the federal interest in aviation safety, it
was "'far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of
federal law to [an area] essentially of local concern."' Id. at 32-33 (quoting Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956)). Similarly, pollu-
tion injuries, like other essentially local private disputes, present no substantial
issues of federal law. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497
(1971); Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 708. Absent a substantial federal interest,
"[t]he determination by federal courts of the scope of [private remedies] involves the
creation of a body of common law analogous to that repudiated in Erie." Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd
mem. sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.
1977). The Supreme Court has concluded that, when private litigation essentially
involves an area traditionally regulated by the state, such as pollution, Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960), "'[t]he exercise of
federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."' New York State Dept. of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S.
199, 203 (1952)); see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Feder-
alism and the Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 642, 647, 653 (1975); Choice of
Law, supra note 6, at 143. "'Whether latent federal power should be exercised to
displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress."' Miree v. DeKalb County,
433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)). In Miree, the Court held that, because Congress had not provided a federal
remedy, no federal common law remedy should be created. Id. at 32-33; see Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1977) (damage action for
breach of federal contract causing fatal airline crash governed by state law despite
federal interest in airline safety); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68-69 (1966) (rights of private parties dealing in federal oil and gas leases issued
under Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C §§ 181-287 (1976), decided under state
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Some courts, in considering whether federal or state law should
apply to damage actions brought pursuant to the CWA's savings
clause, have selected federal lav because it supplies a uniform rule of
decision." This approach fails to recognize that
there is no federal interest in uniformity for its own sake. The fact
that application of state law may produce a variety of results is of
no moment. It is in the nature of a federal system that different
states will apply different rules of lav, based on their individual
perceptions of what is in the best interests of their citizens.'
Before a court may fashion a uniform federal rule of decision, it must
study the policies underlying a federal statute to determine whether
the "absence [of uniformity] would threaten the smooth functioning of
those consensual processes that federal . . . law is chiefly designed topromote." ,10
The policies of the CWA are clearly designed to foster state law;"'
nonuniformity is built into the statute."2  In a similar choice of law
situation, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the policies of the
Labor Management Relations Act required a uniform time limitation
on actions brought under the provisions of the Act." In applying
state law, the Court said that
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote .. .the formation
of the collective agreement and the private settlement of disputes
under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into play
only when these processes have already broken down. Lack of uni-
formity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any impor-
tant way the achievement of any significant goal of labor policy.'"
law); In re Agent Orange, No. 80-7079, slip op. at 10-12 (2d Cir. May 1. 1980)
(damage action for injuries to Army personnel under federal chemical welfare pro-
gram controlled by state law). See also Choice of Law, supra note 6, at 150-54.
138. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 122, 1233-35
(3d Cir.), cert. granted sub. nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12);
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017-18 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); cf. Board of Supervisors v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976) (assumed jurisdiction over claim for
damages based on federal common law), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1977).
139. In re Agent Orange, No. 80-7079, slip op. at 11 (2d Cir. May 1, 19S0) (cita-
tion and footnote omitted); accord, Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-29
(1977); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68-71 (1966); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702-04 (1966); United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 354-57 (1966); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S.
29, 33-34 (1956).
140. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702 (1966).
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
142. See note 132 supra.
143. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703 (1966).
144. Id. at 702.
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Pollution damage actions present a similar choice of law problem. A
damage action results only when the federal regulatory process has
failed to abate pollution, the primary goal of the CWA. 1' Although
damage actions may have a deterrent effect, they do not stop pollu-
tion; the pollutor merely pays the judgment as a license to continue
polluting. "6 Disparate results in this area will not frustrate any poli-
cies or goals of the CWA.
III. PROTECTION OF THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN STATE
SOVEREIGNTY: PRESERVATION OF INTERSTATE COMMON LAW
The federal common law adopted in Illinois to protect the federal
interest in the purity of the nation's water has now been supplanted
by the CWA. 17  Another independent federal interest recognized in
Illinois, the interest in maintaining state sovereignty within a federal
system,'" has not been systematically addressed by federal legislation.
This federal interest, however, has long been within the purview of
the federal common law149 and continues to provide states with a
unique cause of action, a parens patriae suit, 1' to protect their quasi-
sovereign interests in interstate resources.' 5'
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
146. Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd
mem. sub nom. East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir.
1977); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 230, 257 N.E.2d 870, 876,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 321 (1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting); Esposito, supra note 125, at 35;
Maloney, supra note 125, at 148; Nuances of Nuisance, supra note 11, at 70-71 &
n. 162.
147. See pts. I(B), II supra.
148. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1972).
149. See, e.g., Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974) (per curiam); Texas v.
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931);
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S.
125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838). See generally The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at
516-17 (Modem Library ed. 1937); Friendly, supra note 6, at 408 n.119; Hill, supra
note 6, at 1030-32; Monaghan, supra note 6, at 13-14 & n.72; Scott, The Role of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Settlement of Inter-State Disputes, 15
Geo. L.J. 146, 162-63 (1927); Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 708-09; Federal
Common Law, supra note 6, at 1520; Original Jurisdiction, supra note 37, at 681.
150. When a state sues as parens patriae, it acts in its role as guardian and
sovereign. Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See generally Malina &
Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65
Nw. U.L. Rev. 193, 197-209 (1970); Note, State Protection of its Economy and En-
vironment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 Colum. L.J. & Soc. Prob. 411, 411-
13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Protection].
151. E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (interstate
transportation); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932) (interstate water);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923) (interstate natural gas); New
York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921) (interstate water); Georgia v. Ten-
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The use of a parens patriae suit to protect quasi-sovereign interests
requires a state to show that it is asserting the general rights of the
state and not the private interests of its citizens.' The state must
have "a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for
the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest." M Such
a distinct interest arises only when the injury seriously jeopardizes
the health, comfort, and welfare of the state as a whole.L I Histori-
cally, when such an injury was demonstrated, the state, as a matter of
sovereign right, was permitted to vindicate its interests in the Sup-
reme Court.I
"Interstate common law" 56 was developed by the Supreme Court
as an equitable rule of decision for adjudicating disputes between
neighboring states concerning their respective quasi-sovereign in-
terests in interstate resources.", Although states may freely utilize
nessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (interstate air). Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (interstate water).
152. Georgia v. Pennsylvania, 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945). \Vyoming v. Colorado,
286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591-92
(1929); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., -20 U.S. 277, 288-99 (1911) Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Kansas v. Colorado. 206 U.S.
46, 99 (1907); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900), New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1883). Parens patriae standing cannot "'be invoked by
a State merely because its citizens were injured." Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 451 (1945).
153. Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938). accord. Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
154. E.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (railroad rate-
fixing damaged general economic welfare of the state). Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 591 (1923) (statute requiring preferential treatment of West Virginia
gas customers injured health and welfare of Pennsylvania), Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (pollution injured health and environment of
state); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (sewage endangered health of
citizens); see Malina & Blechman, supra note 150, at 203. State Protection, supra
note 150, at 417.
155. Malina & Blechman, supra note 150, at 203.
156. The phrase "interstate common law" was coined by the Supreme Court to
describe the body of federal common law developed to settle disputes involving the
quasi-sovereign rights of states in interstate resources. Kansas v. Colorado. 206 U.S.
46, 98 (1907). Commentators have recognized that this federal common law is consti-
tutionally compelled, and thus, distinct from other areas of federal common law.
Friendly, supra note 6, at 408 n.119; Hill, supra note 6. at 1030-32, 1075-76,
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 13-14 & n.72.
157. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 524 (1936) (suit to enjoin water diver-
sion); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931) (same). Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-71 (1931) (same); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296, 298 (1921) (suit to enjoin discharge of sewage into water). Kansas v. Col-
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resources within their borders,"" the ecological rights of one state
preclude the detrimental use by another of the resources shared by
all.159 When one state's exercise of its sovereign powers injured the
quasi-sovereign interests of another, the Supreme Court, possessed of
exclusive original jurisdiction, provided impartial federal rules of de-
cision to adjudicate the conflicting interests."6
Similar reasoning was adopted for interstate pollution disputes be-
tween a state and a citizen of another state brought under the Court's
original, but nonexclusive, jurisdiction. In Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co.,' for example, the Court found that Georgia's quasi-
sovereign interests in its environment should not be circumscribed by
the inadequate pollution laws of its neighboring state." 2 Conversely,
the laws of the complaining state should not prevail over the eco-
nomic and social policy decisions that permitted the defendant's
conduct." 3 The basic tenets of federalism demand that no state
"legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.""
orado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902) (suit to enjoin water diverson); Missouri v. Illi-
nois, 180 U.S. 208, 241-45 (1901) (suit to enjoin discharge of sewage into water). For
a collection of controversies between states under the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction, see Original Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 708-18.
158. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 719 (1838).
159. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) ("One cardinal rule, underlying
all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equality of right.").
160. E.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931); New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
"[W]henever ... the action of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws
into the territory of another State, the question of the extent ... of the rights of the
two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute." Id. at 97-98.
161. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). The State of Geoigia sought the abatement of damaging
smoke emissions from defendant's out-of-state factory. Id. at 236-37.
162. Id. at 237. Because of potential parochialism, Georgia could not have been
constitutionally compelled to seek relief in the courts of Tennessee regardless of the
remedies available. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475 (1793).
163. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1971);
The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton); Friendly, supra note 6, at 408 n.119;
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 12-14. The vested interests of either state would, of
course, find their expression in state law. Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 710. The
offending state would surely want to protect the economic well-being of its citizens
from a damaging injunction, while the victim state would surely want to protect the
health and comfort of its citizens. The intergovernmental conflict that exists in such
suits should be resolved by resort to an impartial arbiter. Woods & Reed, supra note
40, at 710-11; Interstate Pollution, supra note 3, at 1449; e.g., Nebraska v. Wyom-
ing, 325 U.S. 589, 608 (1945), modified on other grounds, 345 U.S 981 (1953); North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1923).
164. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881); accord, Kansas v. Colo-
rado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). "Each State stands on the same level with all the rest.
[Vol. 49
WATER POLLUTION
The Tennessee Copper rationale remains an important principle of
interstate relations. Interstate pollution still presents difficult ques-
tions of conflicting state economic and social policies.'" Neither state
should have these important policy decisions made for them by their
neighboring state's government or courts.'" The submission of these
conflicts to the impartial rules of federal law is both a necessary rule
of federalism' and a practical vehicle for maintaining national peace
and harmony.' 6s The Illinois decision simply reaffirmed the basic
premise of Tennessee Copper that interstate pollution disputes impli-
cating a state's quasi-sovereign interests be decided under federal
law.'6 The only difference was diversion of these disputes to federal
district courts. 17
The passage of the CWA raises the question whether common law
derived from our constitutional structure of government survives a
legislative act of Congress. Clearly, Congress may abrogate or sup-
It can impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its
own views to none." Id. at 97-98.
165. Stewart, supra note 24, at 1227-28; Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 710;
Interstate Pollution, supra note 3, at 1449; Air Pollution, supra note 118, at 117.
166. Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240-42 (10th Cir. 1971);
Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 700-01, 710; 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 597, 603-10. See
also New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931); Hill, supra note 6, at
1030-32; Monaghan, supra note 6, at 13-14 & n.72.
167. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888); Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475-76 (1793); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 6, at 18-19.
Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 705-06. The grant of original jurisdiction over
disputes between a state and a citizen of another state implied federal power to
create substantive rules of decision when the nature of the dispute made the applica-
tion of state law inappropriate. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 408 n.119; Hill, supra
note 6, at 1030-32; Scott, supra note 149, at 163-64; Stew%-art, supra note 24, at 1229;
Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 708-11; Federal Common Law, supra note 6, at
1520. Therefore, " '[flederal common law and not the varying common law of the
individual States is . .. entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing
... with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources
outside its domain.' " Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 n.9 (1972)
(quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)).
168. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945) (Original jurisdiction
was designed "so that adequate machinery might be available for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between States and between a State and a citizen of another
State."); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("When the
States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to
each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not
renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this
court."); see The Federalist No. 80 (A. Hamilton), at 516-17 (Modern Library ed.
1937); Scott, supra note 149, at 158-59.
169. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-08, 107 n.9 1972).
170. Id. at 100.
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plant established common law rights and duties."' Statutes that di-
vest " 'preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the
sovereign,' "172 however, " 'without a clear expression or implication
to that effect.' "173 Interstate common law actions are not expressly
precluded by the CWA. Indeed, they are implicitly preserved by the
CWA's savings clause. 7 4 Legislative debates also demonstrate that
Congress specifically focused on the interstate common law of
nuisance 7 and concluded that enactment of the CWA would not
limit or preclude this cause of action. 17
171. Carlson v. Green, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1476 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 564-66 (1963); United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121,
124 (1958); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931). There is as presump-
tion against abrogation when the common law rights of a sovereign are concerned.
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976); Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora
Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220, 224-25 (1957); United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1949);
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947); Dollar Say. Bank
v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873); United States v. Atlantic-
Richfield Co., 478 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (D. Mont. 1979).
172. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (quoting United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947)).
173. Id. (quoting United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 (1949)).
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976). Although it is not clear whether Congress en-
visioned interstate common law when drafting this section, Congress is presumed to
be aware of all preexisting laws when enacting regulatory schemes. United States v.
Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 707-08 (1961); St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. United States, 251
U.S. 198, 207 (1920); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 163 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926 (1980) (No. 79-408); 4 C. Sands, Sutherland's
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 50.01, at 268 (4th ed. 1974).
175. 118 Cong. Rec. 10780 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note
1, at 688 (remarks of Rep. Dingell).
176. Id. at 33705-09. reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 191-94
(remarks of Sen. Griffin). The legislative debates indicate a congressional awareness
that "[federal courts have . . .traditionally upheld the right of the States to protect
the health and safety of their citizens." Id. at 10773, reprinted in 1 Legislative His-
tory, supra note 1, at 676 (remarks of Rep. Fraser). In fact, concern was expressed
that the passage of the CWA would alter the outcome of Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), a suit based, in part, on interstate common law.
Id. at 33705, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 191 (remarks of
Sen. Griffin). Senator Hart replied that "the suit now pending against the Reserve
Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899 will in no way be affected nor will any of
the other counts under the existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act or other
law." Id. at 33713, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 1, at 211 (remarks
of Sen. Hart) (emphasis added). This view was shared by Senator Muskie. Id. at
33706, reprinted in 1 Legislative History, supra note 300, at 192-93 (remarks of Sen.
Muskie); Senator Muskie's views, as principal author of the CWA, are entitled to
substantial weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978); E.I. du Pont dc
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977). In fact, in an interstate pollution
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In the absence of an explicit congressional declaration to preclude
previously existent common law actions, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that such a right "is not to be abrogated 'unless it be found
...so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would
in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words,
render its provisions nugatory.' "' Interstate common law presents
no "irreconcilable conflict" '7 with the policies of the CWA. The
CWA's policies to "preserve and protect the primary . . . rights of
States"" are, in fact, furthered by interstate common law. Although
the CWA gives states the unique right to promulgate and enforce
more stringent standards than those imposed by the EPA,' ° the Act
does not provide a federal remedy for violations of those standards by
transboundary pollution. Far from conflicting with the CWA, inter-
state common law serves as a vital supplementary mechanism for pro-
tecting states' quasi-sovereign interests in interstate water.''
The Illinois 182 litigation presently before the Supreme Court dem-
dispute, the Supreme Court apparently recognized that interstate common law con-
tinues to exist despite the CWA. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 275 n.5
(1974) (per curiam).
177. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (quoting Texas &
Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907)); accord, Isbrandsten
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
178. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976).
179. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
180. Id. § 1370. This section has been held to allow enforcement actions brought
under state and federal common law. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.. 619 F.2d
623, 630 (7th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3043 (U.S. July 28,
1980) (No. 80-126); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir.
1977); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283-84 (D.S.D. 1979).
The Seventh Circuit has found that 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976), in conjunction with 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976), "suggests, if it does not require, the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt the federal common law" applicable to states. Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 162 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 926
(1980) (No. 79-408).
181. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27-29, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980). The EPA has long viewed the inter-
state common law of nuisance as consistent with the CWA. Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1975). Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 28, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980). In
fact, conformance with EPA regulations does not "[a]uthorize any injury . . .or any
infringement of Federal, State, or local laws or regulations."- 40 C.F.R. § 122.11(d)(2)
(1980). As the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the CWA, the EPA's views
are entitled to substantial deference. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 134-35 & n.25 (1977); Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256
(1976); see EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 226-27 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60,
87 (1975).
182. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S.
926 (1980) (No. 79-408).
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onstrates the utility and continued necessity of interstate common
law. Pursuant to provisions of the CWA,8 both Illinois and Wiscon-
sin instituted their own water pollution control programs.'" Both
programs complied with minimum federal standards.' In fact, Il-
linois promulgated water quality standards for its portion of Lake
Michigan that were more stringent than those set by the EPA.', Wis-
consin, however, did not set similarly high standards of pollution con-
trol for waters within its jurisdiction.'7 When lake currents carried
pollutants from Wisconsin to Illinois, the purpose and effect of Illi-
nois' legislation was defeated.1 s The CWA, in addressing the prob-
lem of conflicting state programs, provides that a state whose waters
are affected by discharges in another state may only recommend that
the other state adopt more effective water quality standards or im-
pose higher effluent limitations in particular permits. 89 Neither the
federal courts nor the federal administrator are authorized to reject a
state permit or a state water quality standard that is in compliance
with the terms of the CWA and existing EPA regulations."9' There-
fore, the CWA, like the FWPCA before it, fails to provide a means of
183. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(d) (1976).
184. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980).
185. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (1976) (all state programs must comply with
federal standards).
186. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 n. 16, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980).
187. Compare Illinois Water Pollution Control Board Rules and Regulations ch. 3,
§§ 101-1205 (1979), reprinted in 1 Envir. Rep. State Water Laws (BNA) 766:0501-
0528 (1979), with Wisconsin Administrative Code ch. NR 102-297.13 (1978), re-
printed in 2 Envir. Rep. State Water Laws (BNA) 951:1001-2092 (1979).
188. See Brief for Respondents at 23-25, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, No. 79-408
(U.S., filed Sept. 22, 1980). The Illinois litigation illustrates the state's vulnerability
to its neighbor's intrastate conduct. The State of Illinois' shoreline on Lake Michigan
is located between Indiana's vast industrial belt (the steel mills of Gary, Hammond,
and East Chicago) and the Milwaukee metropolitan area. Id. at 21. The distance
between these areas is less than sixty miles. Id. Pollutants dumped into the lake
easily flow in either direction into Illinois' waters. Id. at 22.
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1976) (state may request public hearings and urge
imposition of higher standards); id. § 1342(b)(5) (state may request administrator to
veto permits and formulate new permit); id. § 1313(c) (state may request higher
standards as necessary to protect state).
190. District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 861-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 165 n.25 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
445 U.S. 926 (1980) (No. 79-408); United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822,
835 (7th Cir. 1975); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284
(D.S.D. 1979); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 31 n.43, City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980). See generally Note, Juris-
diction to Review Informal EPA Influence Upon State Decision-Making Under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1814 (1979).
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protecting a state's quasi-sovereign interests in interstate water from
pollution permitted in a neighboring state.' Interstate common lav
fills this void in the federal scheme.1' -"
Clearly, the functioning of a federal system is best served by a
nonparochial mechanism for addressing grievances between the laws
and policies of several states.' Some commentators and courts,
however, have argued that this rationale justifies application of inter-
state common law to all transboundary pollution disputes, including
those affecting only private individuals.'"' These arguments fail to
realize that a private individual, under most circumstances, has no
concern in protecting the quasi-sovereign interests of a state." The
citizen usually complains of injury to his personal and aesthetic well-
being. "
Application of interstate common law to an), interstate pollution
dispute, regardless of the parties involved, does, however, find some
191. The failure of the FWPCA to provide an effective mechanism for protecting a
state's quasi-sovereign interests was the primary impetus for the Illinois decision.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1972). The failure of tile CWA to
address this issue adequately was crucial to the Seventh Circuit's decision to grant
injunctive relief under interstate common law. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599
F.2d 151, 163, 165 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 445 U.S. 921 (1980) (No. 79-40S.
192. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 31, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 3, 1980); Water Pollution Disputes, supra note
1, at 160-61. See also Stewart, supra note 24, at 1229-30 (pollution spillovers require
federal court adjudication until addressed by federal legislation, Air Pollution, supra
note 118, at 143 (problem of conflicting state pollution standards under Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979), could be solved through use of inter-
state common law).
193. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 6, at 263-64; Stewart, supra note 24, at 1229;
Water Pollution Disputes, supra note 30, at 160-61. Transboundary spillovers of pol-
lutants inherently present the potential for interstate friction. Stew%-art, supra note 24,
at 1228-30; Woods & Reed, supra note 40, at 710-11. Although actual armed in-
tervention is inconceivable, dramatic political repercussions could be equally danger-
ous to interstate relations. Brief for Respondents at 13, 34-35, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, No. 79-408 (U.S., filed Sept. 22, 1980). In fact, to defeat the effect of the
Illinois decision, Wisconsin Congressmen made repeated attempts to legislatively
overturn the ruling by amending the FWPCA. Id. at 78 n.16.
194. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 122-, 1234 (3d
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 314 (1980) (Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12).
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1018-19 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v.
United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1975); Byram River v.
Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Campbell, supra,
note 7, at 272; High Water Mark, supra note 3, at 10104; Environment, supra note
7, at 10172; Federal Common Law Remedies, supra note 7, at 557.
195. 26 Emory L.J. 433, 440-41, 456 (1977); 1977 Wash. U.L.Q. 164, 169.
196. See W. Prosser, supra note 11, § 88, at 587-88. To recover for a public
nuisance a plaintiff must show damages different in kind from those suffered by the
public. Burgess v. Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 821C (1979).
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basis in a Supreme Court decision in which federal common law was
utilized to resolve an interstate water dispute between private indi-
viduals. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co.," Colorado and New Mexico had a compact detailing their re-
spective rights to water in an interstate river.", The La Plata Com-
pany's rights in the river water, however, antedated the compact, and
they brought suit to prevent interference with those rights.'" The
Supreme Court held that federal common law supplied the rule of
decision despite the absence of a state as a party.2 1° In reaching this
conclusion, the Court recognized that adjudication of the private liti-
gants rights to the river water would directly impact the quasi-
sovereign interests of both New Mexico and Colorado."' The in-
terests of the states were so inexorably bound to those of the private
company it was as though the state were a party to the action." 2
Thus, the Court, in requiring the use of federal common law, looked
to the private litigant's implication of his state's quasi-sovereign in-
terests and not solely to the interstate nature of the dispute.2,3
Although it may be rare, when the public's health, comfort or welfare
are endangered, and the private individual seeks vindication of the
general wrong, the assertion of the state's quasi-sovereign rights
would be well-founded, and an interstate common law cause of action
should be available.2
197. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
198. Id. at 95-96. The interstate compact between Colorado and New Mexico pro-
vided, inter alia, that, to make the most efficient use of the La Plata River during
the summer months, the state administrators would have authority to direct the en-
tire flow to each state on an alternating basis. Id. at 108.
199. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 25
P.2d 187 (1933), rev'd, 304 U.S. 92 (1938). The La Plata Company objected to the
use of the river water under the interstate compact as it deprived the company of
water for periods of 10 days at a time. Id. at 132, 239 P.2d at 188. The Colorado
Supreme Court found that the company had a vested right to the river water and
held that the state could not barter this right away in a compact that failed to pro-
vide compensation. Id.
200. 304 U.S. at 110-11.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 111. It has been noted that the cases the Court relied on, id. n.13, are
not squarely on point. Hill, supra note 6, at 1075 n.246.
203. See Hill, supra note 6, at 1076 (choice of law in Hinderlider required by
Constitution).
204. Ordinarily, a state will wish to bring suit, thus precluding intervention by its
citizens. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 374 (1953). "An intervenor whose
state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling interest
in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and crea-
tures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state." Id. at
373. A suit by a private individual would most often occur when his state is polluting
or permitting the pollution of an interstate body of water, to the detriment of the
general welfare. E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
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A remaining question is whether federal common law should apply
to municipalities.' A municipality possesses no sovereign status'
and must be viewed as a private entity. Possessing the practical
advantage of asserting the collective rights of its citizens, however, a
municipality may have less difficulty persuading a federal court that
the controversy implicates the rights of the state. '
Two recent decisions upheld a municipality's ability to pursue
federal nuisance actions. In City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid
Recycling, Inc.,' the Seventh Circuit validated the city's cause of
action for damages resulting from transboundary pollution of the
municipal water supply."' The court acknowledged that the CWA
evinced no congressional intent to provide for a private cause of ac-
tion for damages; the citizen suit provisions were exclusive." The
court, however, relying on Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co.,2- applied interstate common law, reasoning that
"[t]he interests of the state in this interstate pollution dispute are
implicated in the same way such interests were implicated in Illinois
v. Milwaukee."' 212 The court's rationale for invoking interstate com-
mon law, however, is vitiated by its own finding that "plaintiffs do
not seek to represent the 'quasi-sovereign interest' . . . or the ecolog-
ical rights . . . of the state of Indiana." " In a better reasoned opin-
ion, the District Court of New Jersey specifically relied upon a
township's well-founded assertion of its state's quasi-sovereign in-
terest in granting interstate common law relief. The Township of
U.S. 92 (1938) (state "bartered" away quasi-sovereign interests to detriment of its
citizens); Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J.
1978) (state permitted local sewage districts to pollute coastal waters to detriment of
its own economy). In such instances, the private suit should be allowed because the
state has failed in its parens patriae role.
205. Compare Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 566 (E.D.
Va. 1976) (applies), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977) with City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 1979)
(does not apply), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) and Township of Long Beach v.
City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (D.N.J. 1978) (does not apply).
206. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122. 131
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Board of Supervisors v. United States,
408 F. Supp. 556, 566 (E.D. Va. 1976), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1977); Air Pollution, supra note 118, at 134.
207. See Air Pollution, supra note 118, at 134.
208. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
209. Id. at 1019. The defendants allegedly discharged toxic chemicals into the
sewer system, which eventually flowed into the Ohio River, the source of the plain-
tiffs' drinking supply. Id. at 1010.
210. Id. at 1012-16.
211. 304 U.S. 92 (1938). See generally IA J. Moore, Federal Practice ' 0.320 (3d
ed. 1980).
212. 604 F.2d at 1018.
213. Id. at 1017 (footnotes omitted).
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Long Beach v. City of New York"' dispute centered upon the same
pollution that generated the National Sea Clammers litigation."'3 Un-
like the claim brought by the National Sea Clammers Association, the
township's claim rested on its assertion of the state's quasi-sovereign
interest in the ocean waters."1 6 The court stated that, although "the
decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee should not be extended to
encompass an action by a private person,"" 7 the significant interests
asserted by the township implicated the entire state, and were there-
fore sufficient to uphold the interstate common law claim." 8 It is
apparent from the nature and extent of the pollution involved that
more than the independent interests of the township's citizens were
involved. The township claimed that if the pollution of the coastal
waters of New Jersey continued, it would result in severe economic
injury to the state as a whole . 2 " The court's finding of a statewide
impactm demonstrates that the township's claim not only implicated
its proprietary rights, but in fact, involved the general health and
welfare of the entire state. This, and any similar finding by a court,
would justify use of interstate common law.
CONCLUSION
Utilization of federal common law in derogation of the CWA's
statutory scheme constitutes a clear violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. Once Congress has supplied the legislative policies
and national priorities in a statute, federal courts must adhere to its
provisions. With the enactment of the CWA, Congress has clearly
spoken on how best to protect the nation's waters. Federal courts
have no common law powers to supercede this congressional man-
date.
The CWA, however, fails to include an effective statutory solution
to the problem of conflicting state water quality standards in inter-
state water. This serious deficiency in the federal regulatory scheme
justifies the continued existence of a unique type of federal common
law. Interstate common law, designed specifically to protect quasi-
sovereign interests in interstate resources, was preserved by the
214. 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978).
215. High Water Mark, supra note 3, at 10102.
216. 445 F. Supp. at 1214.
217. Id. at 1213 (citation omitted).
218. Id. at 1214.
219. Id.
220. Id. ("The interests sought to be protected herein are ones which affect the
entire state, both aesthetically and economically.").
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CWA and provides a flexible and effective means of filling the void in
the statute. Interstate pollution will continue to create tensions be-
tween states, a problem that can only be authoritatively resolved by
federal intervention. Until Congress definitively addresses this prob-
lem, interstate common law must remain available to compel what
interstate compromise fails to provide.
William F. Haigney
